<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><channel><title>Mechanism-Design on The Feasible Set</title><link>https://gstechschulte.github.io/categories/mechanism-design/</link><description>Recent content in Mechanism-Design on The Feasible Set</description><generator>Hugo -- 0.135.0</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Fri, 29 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://gstechschulte.github.io/categories/mechanism-design/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Mechanism Design - A Primer</title><link>https://gstechschulte.github.io/posts/2026-05-08-thinking-about-mechanism-design/</link><pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://gstechschulte.github.io/posts/2026-05-08-thinking-about-mechanism-design/</guid><description>&lt;p>This post is an ongoing investigation of my &lt;a href="https://gstechschulte.github.io/posts/2025-09-02-future-of-ai/">alternative view of AI&lt;/a> and the role of algorithms for multi-agent systems in markets.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Game theory is concerned with predicting the behavior of agents participating in an strategic interaction. We can also ask the inverse. Given a desired behavior of the agents, what strategic interaction would give rise to this behavior? For example, there are two firms $A$ and $B$. Each firm can choose to cooperate $C$ or defect $D$ which results in the following payoff matrix&lt;/p></description></item></channel></rss>